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PANEL DISCUSSION
LINDA FAIRSTEIN*
S IR Matthew Hale, who was Lord Chief Justice of the King's Bench
in England, once wrote an opinion in a rape case which has been
paraphrased in courtrooms and in living rooms almost ever since. Ac-
cording to Justice Hale, rape is an accusation that is so easy for a woman
to make and so difficult for a man to defend against that it must be ex-
amined with more caution than any other crime.'
Unfortunately, Justice Hale wrote that opinion in 1671. And yet, the
extra caution that Justice Hale required to support the testimony of a
rape victim became in the laws of this country something that was
known as the corroboration requirement.2 The corroboration require-
ment remained a part of our laws for three centuries and was eliminated
only recently from our legal system.
I cannot help but frame this issue in a somewhat personal perspective.
I graduated from law school in 1972 and joined the Manhattan District
Attorney's office that year. At that time, there were no sex crimes prose-
cutors or sex crimes prosecution units anywhere in the country. In fact,
in 1971, although more than 2000 rapes were reported to the New York
City police, only eighteen men were convicted of crimes of sexual assault
in that year.
The reason for such a small number of convictions was due to the
corroboration requirement. This requirement was still in effect when I
joined the Manhattan District Attorney's office. The corroboration re-
quirement mandated that the rape victim prove three elements of her
case by independent evidence. First, the victims had to provide in-
dependent evidence identifying their attacker. Victims often experienced
difficulty proving this element because unlike many crimes, like mug-
gings and bank robberies, that occur in broad daylight and are witnessed
by a number of people, sexual assaults, on the other hand, rarely occur in
such surroundings. Second, there had to be independent evidence that
the defendant used force during the attack. A weapon recovered at the
crime scene or an injury to the victim could suffice. This evidence was
used to prove that the victim had been assaulted. And third, there had to
be evidence of the sexual nature of the attack, usually in the form of
seminal fluid. This left open the problem that if the sexual act had not
* Chief, Sex Crimes Prosecution Unit, New York County District Attorney's Of-
fice; A.B., 1969, Vassar College; J.D., 1972, University of Virginia School of Law.
1. See Louis A. Trosch, Jr., Note, State v. Strickland: Evening the Odds in Rape
Trialsl North Carolina Allows Expert Testimony on Post Traumatic Stress Disorder to
Disprove Victim Consent, 69 N.C. L. Rev. 1624, 1624 n.2 (1991) (quoting 1 M. Hale,
History of the Pleas of the Crown 634 (1847)).
2. See People v. Linzy, 286 N.E.2d 440, 441-42 (N.Y. 1972).
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been completed, there was no way to prove that the crime was of a sexual
nature.
The existence of the corroboration requirement made it virtually im-
possible for the state to prosecute rapists. Whether past legislation gov-
erning crimes of sexual violence was drafted in reaction to the prevailing
public attitudes existing at the time about the crime, or whether these
public attitudes were formed and reinforced by the laws and the legal
mandates, it is clear that rape and other sexual assaults were treated dif-
ferently from any other category of crime within the criminal justice
system.
Correspondingly, victims of sexual assault also have been treated dif-
ferently for centuries. When I started in 1972 at the Manhattan District
Attorney's office, a woman who was robbed at gunpoint by an assailant
caught three weeks later without a weapon and identified in a lineup was
considered legally competent to testify to the armed robbery because of
the corroborating circumstances. Yet, if the same man at the same time
had raped her and there was no corroboration of those elements, she
could not testify about the sexual assault.
Rape has been the only category of crime requiring corroboration. It
was not eliminated as a requirement in New York State until 1974.'
Consider, however, that one could convict someone of murder on cir-
cumstantial evidence alone.
Also consider that victims of sexual assault have always been treated
differently. It is the only crime that is generally viewed as victim-precipi-
tated, occurring because the victim in some way allowed the crime to
occur. Rape victims have always been stigmatized for their behavior,
and for their participation or victimization in this type of crime.
I believe that we as a society have made progress in our response to
rape victims. Our progress, however, has been extraordinarily slow and
has occurred in only some segments of society. Moreover, this progress
has occurred only in regard to certain kinds of victims of sexual assault
cases. Professor Benedict accurately outlines in her book eight factors
that frequently cause the public and the press to blame rape victims.4 It
is still quite commonplace for the community to look with suspicion on
victims who are known to their assailants, commonly referred to as "date
rape" cases, or to victims who are attacked in particular occasions at
particular times of day and night, or to victims who do not offer resist-
ance to their offenders.
3. See People v. Salas, 358 N.Y.S.2d 322, 324 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1974)
4. See Helen Benedict, Virgin or Vamp: How the Press Covers Sex Crimes 19
(1992). These factors are (1) whether the victim knows the assailant; (2) whether a
weapon was used in the attack; (3) whether the victim and assailant are of the same race;
(4) whether the victim and assailant are of the same social class; (5) whether the victim
and assailant are of the same ethnic group; (6) whether the victim is young; (7) whether
the victim is attractive; and (8) whether the victim lived her life consistent with tradi-
tional notions of the female at home with family or children. See id.
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THE PRIVACY RIGHTS OF RAPE VICTIMS
Until we can respond to more survivors with more dignity, I believe
one small measure of respect we can and must offer to rape victims is
their privacy. Those who choose to report the crime should not be
named by the media. As Mr. Gartner stated, it seems clear that every
broadcaster and every publication has the absolute right to publish the
victim's name. Therefore, in my opinion, it is a matter of decency to ask
that those names be withheld.
I agree with Geneva Overholser, the editor of the Des Moines Register,
who encourages women who have been raped to identify themselves and
put their faces to these crimes that have been hidden away for so long.'
Each victim, however, must come to terms with her own experience in
her own way. It should be the right of each victim to decide if and when
she will become identifiable to the public beyond the courtroom, if she
even chooses to go that far. For some women, it is an important step in
their recovery to be publicly identified as a rape victim. For others, how-
ever, it will never be acceptable to take this step.
Before hearing Mr. Gartner's remarks today, I was aware of four me-
dia justifications for printing the names of rape victims. Professor Bene-
dict refers to these in greater detail in her book.6 One justification,
derived from remarks made by Mr. Gartner around the time of the vic-
tim naming in the Palm Beach rape, is that the media is not in the busi-
ness of keeping secrets.' Obviously, this idea was a relatively recent
change of policy for the media who, for a long time, abided by a gen-
tleman's agreement not to name rape victims.
A second justification is that names lend victims credibility.' I find
this argument implausible. I do not understand how a story would ob-
tain more credibility when people who do not know the victim, and who
live outside the community where the victim lives, hear or read the vic-
tim's name. There are occasionally humorous moments in this business.
We have a courthouse reporter who has been with one of our local tab-
loids for forty years and who just celebrated his fortieth anniversary. At
every press conference after a press release in our office, this reporter
raises his hand and says, "please describe the victim," a question that has
been facetiously translated as "what color was the victim's hair"? The
resulting newspaper accounts of these crimes frequently refer to the
raven-haired woman who was attacked, or to the blonde who was com-
ing out of her office building late at night. Interestingly, there is no other
category of crime in which the physical description of the victim plays
5. See Catharine Reeve, Taking Back Her Life: Public Disclosure Helps One Victim
ofRape Become a Survivor, Chi. Trib., Feb. 23, 1992, at CN 3. According to Overholser,
"[o]ver the long haul, society would be better served if rape victims were treated the same
way as adult victims of other crimes.... We are participating in the stigma of rape by
treating this crime differently." James Warren, Naming Rape Victim" A Debatefor Me-
dia, Chi. Trib., Apr. 18, 1991, at C5.
6. See Benedict, supra note 4, at 252-54.
7. See id at 252-53.
8. See id at 253.
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any part in the case. Therefore, I do not understand how naming the
victim in rape cases gives the story more credibility.
A third justification, advanced by Alan Dershowitz, is that naming the
accused but not the accuser unfairly prejudices the accused.9 Although I
agree with this argument in principle, I do not think that naming the
accuser rectifies this inequity. Mr. Gartner said that there was never a
debate at NBC News about naming the accused in the Palm Beach rape.
I feel, however, that it was outrageous for the media to name the accused
before he had even been formally charged with the commission of a
crime. Accordingly, I do not think that naming the victim is an appro-
priate answer to this problem.
The fourth justification is that naming the victim is a way of destigma-
tizing the victim."° I think that it would be wonderful to live in such an
accepting society. But I also think that until we reach that point, it is
each individual victim's right to decide when, and by whom, she should
be identified.
9. See id.
10. See id. at 253-54.
1140 [Vol. 61
